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I. Introduction
This survey article discusses the major EU competition
law developments in the pharmaceutical sector from 1
January 2017 through 31 March 2018. Section II addresses
cases on restrictions of competition from generic suppli-
ers, including the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal’s
judgment in GlaxoSmithKline on patent settlements, the
European Commission’s annual patent settlement moni-
toring report and the French Competition Authority’s
decision in Johnson & Johnson involving an abuse of regu-
latory process and denigration. Section III covers the
recent cases prosecuting excessive pricing, including Aspen
and Pﬁzer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. Section IV dis-
cusses the EU Court of Justice’s judgment in Roche/
Novartis concerning licensing agreements. Section V
addresses recent decisions, judgments, and regulations in
EU Member States on the ongoing issue of parallel trade.
Finally, Section VI covers the opening of new national
pharmaceutical sector inquiries.
II. Restriction of competition on
generic suppliers
A. Reverse-payment patent settlements
1. Introduction
While the last year has not seen any new decisions against
pharmaceutical companies involving reverse-payment
patent settlements, the existing cases have continued to
wind their way through the courts, with the principal
development arising in the UK GlaxoSmithKline case, in
which the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has
issued a judgment that refers questions of EU law to the
EU Court of Justice. This referral, together with the separ-
ate appeal in Lundbeck, gives the Court of Justice an
opportunity to resolve the long-standing debate on how
such patent settlements should be assessed under EU
competition law.
As background, certain reverse-payment patent set-
tlements have come under scrutiny by European com-
petition authorities under the theory that innovative
pharmaceutical companies may use such settlements to
unfairly delay or prevent generic market entry to the
detriment of the consumer. The Commission issued
decisions in these types of cases in Lundbeck in 2013
and in Servier in 2014, while the UK Competition and
Markets Authority (CMA) issued its decision in
GlaxoSmithKline in 2016. All of these decisions were
immediately appealed, with Lundbeck in the lead and
now before the Court of Justice, following an earlier
judgment by the General Court upholding the
Commission’s decision. Servier is on appeal to the
General Court, but has now been leapfrogged by
GlaxoSmithKline, which is already before the Court of
Justice due to the referral from the UK CAT.
GlaxoSmithKline will thus take on increased importance
in the development of the law on reverse-payment
patent settlements, as it will be the ﬁrst case in which
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Key Points
• Competitive restrictions on generics remain an area
of focus, as reverse-payment patent settlement cases
work their way through the EU and UK courts and
a new denigration decision was issued against
Johnson & Johnson in France.
• Excessive pricing of off-patent medicines is garner-
ing increased attention at both EU and national
level (the European Commission has opened its
ﬁrst pharmaceutical excessive pricing investigation
against Aspen).
• While there have been new developments in antic-
ompetitive licensing agreements, notably the
European Court of Justice’s ruling in Roche/
Novartis, the area of parallel trade remains rela-
tively quiet.
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the Court of Justice must address whether such settle-
ments constitute an abuse of dominance or a restriction
of competition ‘by effect’, issues which did not arise in
Lundbeck.
We brieﬂy recall the details of Lundbeck and Servier,
and, in the next section, discuss the recent referral to
the Court of Justice in GlaxoSmithKline.
Lundbeck. In September 2016, the General Court
issued its judgments in the ﬁrst-ever case on reverse-
payment patent settlements in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor, upholding the Commission’s decision against
Lundbeck, the Danish pharmaceutical company, and
the generic manufacturers Alpharma, Merck KGaA/
Generics UK, Arrow and Ranbaxy.1 As noted, these
judgments are currently on appeal to the Court of
Justice.2
While the circumstances and agreements for each
settlement were different, and thus each judgment by
the General Court – one for each of Lundbeck and the
generics – is different, there are certain common core
issues that are important from the standpoint of the
development of competition law and policy. These
appeals offer the Court of Justice a superb occasion to
provide guidance on how to strike the correct balance
between intellectual property and competition law.
The arguments on appeal are likely to centre on the
role of the patent in both the analysis of potential com-
petition and whether there is a restriction by object. The
General Court’s judgment seems to endorse a low
threshold for the existence of potential competition as it
seems sufﬁcient that the generic has taken steps to enter
the market. The existence of a patent would rarely, if
ever, be viewed as excluding potential competition as
the generic would always have at least some chance of
winning in any eventual patent litigation. Likewise, the
General Court seems to gloss over the patent in con-
cluding that there is a restriction of competition by
object. This conclusion seems questionable as it neces-
sarily assumes that the originator would have little
chance of excluding the generic in the absence of the
agreement. Lundbeck and the generics will undoubtedly
seek to convince the Court of Justice that the General
Court failed to analyse properly the role of the patent in
reaching its conclusions.
This case also offers the Court of Justice an unusually
good opportunity to clarify the scope and meaning of a
‘by object’ restriction. As it seemed to take the combin-
ation of a sector inquiry, a 10-year investigation and a
466-page decision for the Commission to reach the con-
clusion that the settlement agreements at issue in this
case infringed Article 101, it would seem at least ques-
tionable whether they should be treated as ‘by object’
restrictions that ‘by their very nature’ are restrictive of
competition, particularly in light of the Court of
Justice’s ruling in Cartes Bancaires,3 in which it seemed
to narrow the scope of the ‘by object’ restriction.
Moreover, it would seem at least debatable whether the
agreements had the kind of high likelihood of restricting
competition that characterises restrictions by object
given that the available evidence seemed to suggest that
Lundbeck had a reasonable chance (40–50 per cent) of
winning the patent litigation.
Servier. In 2014, the Commission imposed a ﬁne of
€331 million on Servier, the French pharmaceutical
company, and ﬁnes totalling €96 million on ﬁve generic
manufacturers – Unichem, Matrix (now Mylan), Teva,
Krka, and Lupin.4 This decision is currently on appeal
to the General Court.5
The Commission’s decision in Servier differs from
the Lundbeck decision in two key respects. First, while
the Commission only analysed the settlement agree-
ments under a ‘by object’ test in Lundbeck, it hedged its
bets and also applied an ‘effects’ test in Servier. Second,
the Commission found that, in addition to entering into
agreements that restricted competition in violation of
Article 101, Servier’s conduct constituted an abuse of its
dominant position in violation of Article 102.
2. GlaxoSmithKline
On 8 March 2018, the UK’s CAT issued its judgment in
GlaxoSmithKline6 concerning appeals against the
1 Case T-472/13, Lundbeck v. Commission, Case T-471/13, Xellia
Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v. Commission, Case T-470/13, Merck v.
Commission, Case T-469/13, Generics (UK) v. Commission, Case T-467/13,
Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v. Commission and Case T-460/13, Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v. Commission (8 September
2016).
2 Case C-591/16, Lundbeck v. Commission; Case C-611/16, Xellia
Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v. Commission; Case C-614/16, Merck v.
Commission; Case C-588/16, Generics (UK) v. Commission; Case C-601/16,
Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v. Commission; and Case C-586/16, Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v. Commission.
3 Case C-67/13P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission
(11 Sept. 2014) (not yet reported).
4 Case AT.39612, Servier, Decision of 9 July 2014.
5 See Cases T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, T-701/14Niche
Generics v Commission, T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission,
T-684/14, Krka v Commission, T-682/14, Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v
Commission, T-680/14, Lupin v Commission, T-679/14, Teva UK and
Others v Commission, T-677/14, Biogaran v Commission.
6 Generics (UK) Limited, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Xellia Pharmaceuticals APS
and Alpharma LLC, Actavis UK Limited and Merck KGAA v. Competition
and Markets Authority, Case Nos. 1251-1255/1/12/16, [2018] CAT 4
(‘GSK’). See also the CAT’s Order for Reference for a Preliminary Ruling
(27 March 2017).
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CMA’s decision imposing ﬁnes totalling £44.99 million
on GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and generic manufacturers
for entering into reverse-payment patent settlements in
connection with GSK’s blockbuster anti-depressant drug
Seroxat (paroxetine).7
In 2001, a number of generic competitors sought to
enter the UK market with a generic version of Seroxat,
which was one of the world’s most popular anti-
depressants and one of GSK’s best-selling products.
GSK initially launched litigation against the generics,
alleging that the generic products were infringing its
patents, but, prior to trial, the parties entered into settle-
ments. Under the agreements, GSK agreed to supply the
generics with product and to make payments and other
value transfers totalling over £50 million. In turn, the
generics agreed to refrain from entering the UK market
for paroxetine from 2002 to 2004.
The CMA held that these settlement agreements pro-
tected GSK from the competition it would have other-
wise faced from the threat of entry by independent
generic competitors, and deprived the National Health
Service of the price reductions that normally result from
generic competition. Like the European Commission in
Servier, the CMA relied on both the ‘by object’ and ‘by
effect’ theories in ﬁnding an infringement of Article
101. In addition, the CMA found that GSK had abused
its dominant position in violation of Article 102 as the
payments to the generics meant that GSK took actions
that were different from those characteristic of ’normal
competition.’
On appeal, the UK CAT in March 2018 issued a
judgment rejecting grounds of challenge raised by GSK
and the generics concerning the parties’ rights of
defense, the attribution of liability and whether the
agreements qualiﬁed for UK and EU block exemptions
(safe harbours). However, on the key issues arising in
the case, the CAT decided to stay the proceedings and
refer questions to the EU Court of Justice. As the
CMA’s decision raised many of the same issues as the
European Commission’s decisions that are on appeal to
the European Courts in Lundbeck and Servier, the CAT
hopes to avoid arguments in the UK courts concerning
the application of the eventual judgments in the EU
cases to the UK case.8 The CAT used the opportunity to
set out its provisional views on the questions, which is
relatively rare in references from national courts.
However, as the CAT is bound by Lundbeck, it did not
depart from the approach of the General Court in
Lundbeck on the issues of potential competition and
restriction by object. With regard to the other issues
that were not addressed in Lundbeck – restriction by
effect, market deﬁnition and dominance – the CAT had
more freedom to pursue an independent line of reason-
ing and, as discussed below, disagreed with the CMA on
certain points.
The key issues referred to the Court of Justice are as
follows:
Potential competition. The CAT asked whether an
originator and a generic are potential competitors where
there is a bona ﬁde dispute as to validity and infringe-
ment. The CAT found that the generics in that case
were clearly prepared and willing to enter the market
and did not believe that the entry of interim injunctions
against them in the context of UK litigation meant that
they were no longer potential competitors. The CAT
also emphasised that the General Court’s judgment in
Lundbeck held that the existence of a patent did not
mean that the generics could not be considered as
potential competitors as they could enter the market,
albeit subject to the risk of patent litigation.
Restriction by object. The CAT also asked whether a
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment con-
stitutes a restriction by object. The CAT discussed this
issue at length in its judgment. In contrast to Lundbeck,
GlaxoSmithKline involved ancillary supply agreements
with the generics that arguably produced beneﬁts during
the period covered by the settlement agreements. It will
be interesting to see to what extent this difference could
affect the analysis of the possible restriction by object.
With regard to the issue of whether the strength of the
patent would affect the characterisation of an agreement
as a restriction by object, the CMA seemed slightly
uncomfortable with using the ‘by object’ approach
where the evidence showed that the originator had an
80 per cent chance of winning,9 but considered that it
would not be practical for a competition authority to
engage in an analysis of the strength of the patent.10
Restriction by effect. The CAT asked whether a
restriction of competition by effect required a ﬁnding
that the generic company would probably have suc-
ceeded in the patent litigation or that the parties would
probably have entered into a less restrictive settlement.
On the issue of restriction by effect, the CAT appears to
disagree with the CMA on the grounds that the CMA
failed to show that it was more likely than not that the
counterfactual – i.e. what would have happened in the
absence of a settlement – would have been more com-
petitive. The CAT noted that it was impossible to say
7 Paroxetine, Case CE-9531/11 (12 Feb. 2016)
8 GSK, para. 87.
9 GSK, para. 262.
10 GSK, para. 324.
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that the generic would have won if there had been no
settlement and litigation had continued to judgment.11
Likewise, it found that whether the parties would have
been likely to enter into a less restrictive settlement in
the absence was a matter for ‘pure speculation’.12 While
the CAT admitted that a generic victory in litigation or
a less restrictive settlement were possible, this was not
sufﬁcient without transforming a test of reasonable like-
lihood or probability of effects into ‘a test of the prob-
ability of a possibility’.13
Market deﬁnition. The CAT asked whether the rele-
vant market should include the generics even though
they had not yet entered the market. The CAT’s judg-
ment contains an interesting discussion of the issue of
relevant market deﬁnition in a market that is on the
verge of going generic. The CAT found that the relevant
market would consist of paroxetine and its generic ver-
sions, but would not include anti-depressants that com-
peted with paroxetine prior to generic entry. The basic
reasoning was that generics had a much greater effect
on the price of paroxetine that did other products. As
this same issue is raised in the Servier appeal that would
be likely to eventually reach the Court of Justice, the
CAT believed it would be appropriate to go ahead and
raise the issue with the Court of Justice.
Dominance. The CAT asked whether entering into the
settlement agreements would also constitute an abuse of
a dominant position, particularly if it is part of a broader
strategy of entering into such agreements to delay generic
entry. As Lundbeck did not involve an Article 102 viola-
tion and Servier is not yet before the Court of Justice,
this will be the ﬁrst time that the Court of Justice will
have an opportunity to address this question.
3. Teva
On 17 July 2017, the Commission issued a Statement of
Objections in which it alleged that an agreement con-
cluded with Cephalon in the settlement of UK and US
litigation, in which Teva agreed not to market a generic
for Cephalon’s sleep disorder drug, modaﬁnil, violated
Article 101. Cephalon held patents for both the modaﬁnil
compound and its manufacture. When Cephalon’s
patents on the compound expired, Teva had brieﬂy
entered the UK market with a generic product. Pursuant
to a global settlement with Cephalon for alleged infringe-
ment of its processing patents, Teva agreed not to sell its
generic product in the EEA until 2012, in exchange for
cash payments and other agreements. Teva acquired
Cephalon in 2011, at which time the Commission opened
a formal investigation. The Commission has found that
this settlement constituted a pay-for-delay agreement to
reduce competition by delaying entry for generic modaﬁ-
nil in Europe. This patent settlement was also the subject
of an FTC antitrust investigation, which the parties settled
in 2015.
4. Patent Settlement Monitoring Report
The Commission has issued its Eighth Monitoring
Report14 as part of its ongoing review of patent settle-
ments in the pharmaceutical sector. Each year, origin-
ator and generic companies submit copies of all patent
settlement agreements covering EU/EEA markets con-
cluded during the previous calendar year together with
related agreements. This Report, which adopts the same
language and structure as in previous years, discusses
the main categories of settlements, and then provides an
overview of the responses received from companies and
an analysis of the principal characteristics of the settle-
ments falling under each category. It classiﬁes certain
settlements under Categories A and B.I as unproblem-
atic, which is unsurprising as Category A agreements do
not restrict generic entry at all, while Category B.I
agreements involve no value transfer whatsoever to the
generic entrant i.e. the latter agrees to enter after patent
expiry. The report labels the remaining Category B.II
agreements – those which involve a value transfer from
the originator and no immediate market entry by the
generic – as most likely to raise competition concerns.
Like earlier reports, it is debatable whether this
Report provides any meaningful insight for competition
authorities or companies on the issue of patent settle-
ments. While the Report offers statistics concerning the
patent settlements concluded over the past year, these
provide little meaningful data. For example, the Eighth
Report indicates a slight drop in the number of settle-
ments without indicating how this ﬁgure compares to
the number of cases litigated, rendering the statistic
meaningless. Moreover, by classifying settlements in
terms of their perceived degree of competition law risk,
the Report fails to provide useful guidance, but arguably
creates a chilling effect on the conclusion of settlements
that might be pro-competitive, such as those providing
for early generic entry. Agreements falling into the
benign categories – Categories A and B.I. – are arguably
not truly settlements at all, insofar as one party or the
other has capitulated entirely. Some settlements falling
11 GSK, para. 333.
12 GSK, para. 334.
13 GSK, para. 348.
14 European Commission, 8th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements
(9 March 2018).
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under the higher-risk Category B.II may in fact be pro-
competitive by allowing for early generic entry.
Although the Commission has acknowledged that pure
early entry settlements are ‘not likely to attract the high-
est degree of antitrust scrutiny,’15 it has failed to state
more clearly that these agreements are, in fact, unlikely
to raise competition law concerns. This is one example
of the Commission’s general lack of concrete guidance
on the issue of patent settlements. Given its experience
in the Lundbeck and Servier cases and now eight years
monitoring such agreements, it would appear that the
Commission has enough expertise on the subject to pro-
vide more substance to the limited guidance found in its
monitoring reports.
B. Abuse of regulatory process and denigration
European competition authorities have historically
imposed high ﬁnes on innovative pharmaceutical com-
panies for abusing a dominant position through strategies
to keep their prices high by delaying generic entry or
discouraging prescribing physicians, pharmacists and
consumers from choosing cheaper, generic versions of
their products. On 20 December 2017, the French
Competition Authority (FCA) issued a decision16 impos-
ing a €25 million ﬁne on Janssen-Cilag and its parent
company, Johnson & Johnson, for abusing its dominant
position in the market for transdermal fentanyl patches.
The FCA found that Janssen-Cilag’s abusive conduct con-
sisted of two related strategies to hinder entry and uptake
of generics for its Durogesic patch: (1) unfounded inter-
vention in the national marketing authorisation approval
process, and (2) a widespread denigration campaign to
raise doubts about generics’ safety and efﬁcacy.
In October 2007, following a close evaluation by the
European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European
Commission adopted a decision requiring certain EU
Member States, including France, to provide a national
marketing authorisation for Ratiopharm’s generic trans-
dermal fentanyl patch in mutual recognition of an author-
isation already granted in Germany. Nevertheless, it took
the French medical authority (AFSSAPS) until November
2008 to ﬁnally grant generic status to Ratiopharm’s prod-
uct. The FCA concluded that this delay was the result of
Janssen-Cilag’s repeated and unwarranted interventions.
Speciﬁcally, through multiple letters, presentations and
meetings, Janssen-Cilag conveyed to AFSSAPS its doubts
about the bioequivalence of Ratiopharm’s product, which
contained a different dose of the active ingredient, and
potential patient risks of ‘destabilization’ or ‘overdose’ aris-
ing from any substitution for its Durogesic patches. This
prompted AFSSAPS to initially refuse generic status, and
then to ultimately grant it after many months’ delay with
the warning that certain vulnerable patient groups should
be monitored actively when switching between fentanyl
patches produced by different manufacturers. As a result of
this interference, Ratiopharm’s entry into the generic mar-
ket was delayed for 11 months while it responded to con-
cerns from AFSSAPS.
The FCA concluded that Janssen-Cilag’s intervention
was an abuse of its dominant position. In so doing, it dis-
tinguished two standards according to which this conduct
could be judged: the higher bar of vexatious litigation
established under ITT Promedia,17 and the standard of
misleading information set out in AstraZeneca18 and
Roche/Novartis.19 The FCA rejected the application of the
ITT Promedia standard, ﬁnding it applied only to judicial
proceedings – in which a complainant has a legally-
protected right to appear and thus enjoys a higher level of
protection – and not to interventions before an adminis-
trative body in which the complainant holds no such
right. The FCA concluded that, under the AstraZeneca
misleading information standard, Janssen-Cilag’s inter-
vention was abusive because, given AFSSAPS’ lack of dis-
cretion in light of the prior Commission decision
granting Ratiopharm’s product generic status, its submis-
sions were ‘alarmist,’ ‘legally unfounded and intended to
convince the public authority to make a decision it should
not take.’20 In short, Janssen-Cilag knew the EMA had
already considered its concerns, and that the French
authority was required to approve the product, but it
nonetheless intervened.
The FCA’s ﬁnding that Janssen-Cilag engaged in abu-
sive conduct by intervening in the administrative approval
process is troubling. While the lower AstraZeneca stand-
ard on misleading information might logically apply if the
content of Janssen-Cilag’s submissions to an administra-
tive agency such as the AFSSAPS were demonstrably mis-
leading or incorrect, it would not seem appropriate to rely
on it to assess the kind of abuse -of -regulatory -process
issue alleged by the FCA. Rather than alleging misleading
or incorrect statements, the FCA’s case appears to be
based largely on allegations that Janssen-Cilag made sub-
missions to the AFSSAPS while knowing that the issues it
raised had already been addressed at EU-level and that
AFSSAPS had no choice but to approve the product.
15 8th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, para. 12.
16 Decision 17-D-25 (20 December 2017).
17 Case T-119/09, ITT Promedia v Commission (17 July 1998).
18 Case C-457/10P, AstraZeneca v Commission (6 December 2012).
19 See Part V.A., below.
20 Decision 17-D-25 (20 December 2017), paras. 513, 517.
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Instead of the misleading standard applied by the
FCA, the allegations against Janssen-Cilag would seem
best assessed under the second legal standard estab-
lished in AstraZeneca, in the context of the withdrawal
of AstraZeneca’s marketing authorisation. This standard
is directly applicable to such allegations of abuse of
regulatory process, and establishes that a dominant
company ‘cannot […] use regulatory procedures in such
a way as to prevent or make more difﬁcult the entry of
competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds
relating to the defence of the legitimate interests of an
undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in
the absence of objective justiﬁcation.’21 Applying this
standard, the relevant question would be whether
Janssen-Cilag expression of its concerns about generics
to AFSSAPS was objectively justiﬁed.
Rather than applying this logical, existing legal
standard to the actions of Janssen-Cilag, and thereby
conducting a thorough analysis of the circumstances in
which a dominant pharmaceutical company is justiﬁed
in expressing safety concerns to a regulatory authority,
the FCA instead applied the irrelevant ‘misleading’
standard, which is not ﬁt for purpose and results in
very muddled logic in the decision. Indeed, one key
question not adequately addressed is the contradiction
between the FCA’s allegations that Janssen-Cilag should
have known that it should not submit its safety
concerns to AFSSAPS (even if correct and not mislead-
ing), while the AFSSAPS itself appeared to believe such
submissions were relevant, and therefore spent months
examining the dossier before granting Ratiopharm’s
product generic status. The FCA is thus second gues-
sing the regulatory authority concerning what informa-
tion is allowable and relevant to the regulatory
authority’s assessment, and thereby creating uncertainty
concerning what information companies may submit.
The obvious danger of this decision is that, if compan-
ies have to worry about being attacked on competition
grounds for raising health and safety concerns in the
context of a regulatory process that is not crystal clear,
this could make them reluctant to even raise such
concerns at all.
The FCA also found that Janssen-Cilag conducted a
subsequent denigration strategy to discourage physi-
cians from prescribing generic patches as a substitute
for its Durogesic patch. Janssen-Cilag trained represen-
tatives interacting with medical professionals to empha-
sise the key message that switching patients from
Durogesic to a generic would represent a risk to
patients. In particular, it provided a model set of
responses to questions raised about the suitability of
generic patches, which emphasised that generic versions
did not have the same composition, size or quantity of
fentanyl, which could lead to added variability in the
concentration of the drug in the bloodstream and
increased patient risk. Janssen-Cilag also sent letters to
pharmacists, physicians and medical press outlets reiter-
ating the AFSSAPS’s warning issued with the approval
of Ratiopharm’s generic patch. These letters, however,
mischaracterized the warning in several ways: they
implied incorrectly that the warning related only to the
risk of switching patients from Durogesic to a generic,
whereas the warning applied to a switch between any
products; they failed to mention that such switching
risks could be effectively eliminated by proper medical
surveillance; and they placed undue importance on the
fact that this was the ﬁrst time the AFSSAPS had issued
a warning alongside the marketing authorisation for a
generic, as prior to 2008, French law had not allowed
for such warnings to be issued. Other features of the
denigration campaign included pop-up warnings that
would appear when pharmacists searched for Durogesic
in their computer systems and telephone conference
calls targeting pharmacists.
The FCA’s review of Janssen-Cilag’s internal docu-
ments supported the conclusion that both the interven-
tion in the AFSSAPS procedure and the subsequent
denigration campaign were part of a broad strategy to
discourage generic entry. In particular, the FCA found
that this strategy dated from the formation of an internal
‘ANTI-Generics for Durogesic Team’ at the time the
drug’s patent protection expired in 2005. These docu-
ments also revealed that the company had analysed the
effect on Durogesic’s revenues that could be achieved if
signiﬁcant generic uptake could be delayed from early
2008 to 2009. The FCA concluded that Janssen-Cilag’s
intervention and ‘smear’ campaign had precisely this
effect, justifying the size of the ﬁne imposed.
III. Excessive pricing
A. Policy considerations
At both EU and national level, competition authorities
are showing an increasing willingness to pursue exces-
sive pricing cases against companies marketing off-
patent medications, particularly where there is a drastic
increase in price. In such cases, the authority can easily
judge the new price as excessive with reference to the
prices previously charged. Moreover, as drugs are
21 Case C-457/10P, AstraZeneca v Commission (6 December 2012), para 134.
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expected to drop in price once they are off-patent, price
increases are more likely to be viewed with suspicion,
particularly as the drug’s originator has presumably
already recouped its R&D costs.
In 2017, the European Commission appears to have
abandoned its former reluctance to engage in excessive
pricing investigations. Following on the heels of numer-
ous cases pursued by national competition authorities in
2016, including Aspen, Pﬁzer/Flynn and Actavis, the
Commission has now shown a clear intention to address
excessive pricing for off-patent drugs. In a speech on 27
January 2017, Commissioner Vestager emphasised that
drug prices needed to reward innovation while remain-
ing affordable to the consumer, and that ‘competition
enforcement can help get that balance right.’22 Later in
the year, the Commission launched its ﬁrst excessive
pricing probe against Aspen. This could be the ﬁrst case
in what may become a new area of scrutiny for the
Commission in the pharmaceutical industry now that
its interest in patent settlements appears to be winding
down.
It remains unclear whether the EU or national author-
ities will be willing to extend their investigations to
include excessive prices for innovative products. Chris
Fonteijn, Chairman of the Dutch competition authority
(ACM), recently co-authored a paper highlighting the
need to curb originator companies’ abuse of dominance
though misuse of IP protection mechanisms and exces-
sive pricing.23 In particular, the paper notes that, when
price constraints are too weak, originator companies can
set prices far above the level needed to reward innov-
ation. It recommends that, rather than shielding innova-
tive companies entirely, welfare-enhancing concerns
related to innovation should be just one factor among
others taken into account in the legal test for excessive
pricing. The ACM has indicated that a review of
pharmaceutical prices will be a priority in 2018,24 there-
fore the Netherlands may provide an early test case for
the prosecution of innovative drug companies for exces-
sive pricing.
B. Aspen (EU)
The European Commission opened a formal investigation
into Aspen’s pricing practices for ﬁve life-saving cancer
medications on 15 May 2017.25 The announcement fol-
lows the Italian and Spanish competition authorities’
decisions to investigate Aspen for the same behaviour.
The Commission’s investigation covers the entire EEA,
except Italy, which had already adopted an infringement
decision in 2016, and led the Spanish authority to close
its own investigation in July 2017.26
Aspen had acquired the cancer drugs at issue from
GSK once their patent protection had expired. The
Commission will investigate allegations that Aspen had
engaged in ‘price gouging’ by raising its prices on these
medicines by several hundred per cent. It will also
examine whether Aspen used abusive tactics in negotia-
tions with national authorities or hindered parallel trade
by threatening to withdraw products from the national
market, reducing direct medicine supply or implement-
ing EEA-wide stock allocation strategies with the
cooperation of national wholesalers.
In opening the investigation, the EU signalled its
intention to prosecute companies that engage in exces-
sive pricing practices for off-patent drugs.
Commissioner Vestager indicated that ‘[c]ompanies
should be rewarded for producing these pharmaceuti-
cals to ensure that they keep making them into the
future. But when the price of a drug suddenly goes up
by several hundred per cent, this is something the
Commission may look at.’
C. Aspen (Italy)
On 26 July 2017 the Regional Court of Lazio rejected
Aspen’s appeal of the Italian competition authority’s
(ICA) decision27 to impose a €5.2 million ﬁne on Aspen
for abusing its dominant position by charging excessive
prices for the supply of off-patent cancer drugs it had
acquired from GSK. By applying the two-step test devel-
oped by the Court of Justice in United Brands, the ICA
had concluded that Aspen had increased its prices
300–1,500 per cent over those previously charged by
GSK.
The Court dismissed Aspen’s procedural and sub-
stantive arguments. In particular, the Court upheld the
ICA’s application of the United Brands test. First, it
found that the ICA had correctly determined that
Aspen’s prices were excessive in comparison with its
22 Commissioner Vestager, ’Restoring trust in our economy,’ Speech to the
Association of the Danish Pharmaceutical Industry New Year Conference,
Copenhagen (27 January 2017).
23 Chris Fonteijn, Ilan Akker and Wolf Sauter, ’Reconciling competition and
IP law: the case of patented pharmaceuticals and dominance abuse,’ ACM
Working Paper (8 March 2018).
24 Authority for Consumers & Markets, Press Release, ’ACM’s key priorities
for 2018 and 2019: digital economy, green energy, prescription drug
prices, and ports (13 February 2018).
25 European Commission, Press Release, Commission opens formal
investigation into Aspen Pharma’s pricing practices for cancer medicines
(15 May 2017) (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1323_en.htm).
26 Spanish Competition Authority, Resolution S/DC/0601/17 (20 July 2017).
27 Italian Competition Authority, Case A-480 (29 Sept. 2016).
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costs (assessed based on the gross margin of contribu-
tion and on a cost-plus basis). The second part of the
United Brands test examines whether the excessive
prices charged are unfair, and therefore an abuse of
dominance. The Court sustained the ICA’s decision that
Aspen could not provide any justiﬁcation for the price
increase, rejecting Aspen’s arguments that consumers’
willingness-to-pay should have been considered a rele-
vant factor, given the life-saving nature of the products.
The Court also afﬁrmed that the ICA was correct in
examining Aspen’s pricing negotiations with the Italian
Medicines Agency (AIFA) as part of its determination
of abuse of dominance. The ICA had concluded that
Aspen had used an aggressive negotiating strategy,
leveraging its market position, to force AFIA to accept
its excessive prices. Aspen had ﬁrst demanded that the
cancer drugs be reclassiﬁed as non-reimbursable.
When this approach failed, it threatened to withdraw
the products from the market unless the prices were
substantially increased. The Court clariﬁed that, while
Aspen did not violate the regulatory rules themselves,
Aspen’s interactions with AIFA consisted of a ‘con-
scious use of the negotiating tool’ to abuse its domin-
ant position. Speciﬁcally, Aspen’s negotiating strategy
was ‘expressive of the ultimate aim of taking advantage
of its market power … to impose unfair prices’.
Pharmaceutical companies will therefore need to take
into account the possible competition law risk in deter-
mining how aggressive a stance to take in pricing
negotiations.
D. Pﬁzer/Flynn
Pﬁzer and Flynn Pharma have appealed the CMA’s
decision of 7 December 2016 in which the CMA had
imposed a £84.2 million ﬁne on Pﬁzer and £5.2 million
ﬁne on Flynn Pharma for allegedly charging excessive
and unfair prices for phenytoin sodium capsules. 28 The
appeal is pending before the CAT.
E. Actavis, Intas, Accord
On 16 December 2016, the CMA issued an initial
Statement of Objections against Actavis29 in which it
concluded that the company breached competition law
by charging excessive prices for its hydrocortisone
tablets. Actavis had raised the prices of these off-patent
life-saving products by 9,500–12,000 per cent compared
to prices offered by a company offering a branded ver-
sion of the drug in 2008. The CMA issued a second
Statement of Objections on 9 August 2017, maintaining
the charges against Actavis and naming Intas and
Accord, who purchased the company in January 2017,
as jointly and severally liable.
F. Concordia
The CMA issued a Statement of Objections against
Concordia on 21 November 2017 ﬁnding that the com-
pany had abused its dominant position by charging the
NHS excessive and unfair prices for liothyronine
tablets.30 Liothyronine tablets are prescribed for hypo-
thyroidism, and while they are not the primary treat-
ment for the condition, they are the only suitable
treatment for certain patients. The CMA found that
since the drug had been de-branded in 2007, its price
had risen by almost 6,000 per cent despite largely stable
production costs. The CMA noted that, until 2017,
Concordia had been the only available supplier and
therefore the NHS had no choice but to purchase
lyothyronine tablets at these elevated prices. On 15
February 2018, the CMA announced that it had stopped
is investigation of Concordia’s pricing of fucidic acid
eye drops to focus its attention instead on its liothyro-
nine tablet pricing.
G. CD Pharma
On 31 January 2018, the Danish Competition Council
ruled that CD Pharma, a pharmaceutical distributor,
had abused its dominant position by charging excessive
prices for Syntocin, a drug containing oxytocin adminis-
tered in connection with childbirth.31 Syntocin has been
available on the market since the 1950s and has long
been off-patent. CD Pharma was found to hold a dom-
inant position on the Danish market due to an exclusive
distribution arrangement with the drug’s producer.
According to the Council, CD Pharma increased its
28 Pﬁzer, Press Release, Pﬁzer statement on Competition and Markets
Authority’s infringement decision (7 December 2016) (http://www.pﬁzer.co.
uk/latest-news/2016-12-07-pﬁzer-statement-competition-and-markets-
authority%E2%80%99s-infringement-decision); Flynn Pharma, Press
Release, CMA issue infringement Decision against Flynn (7 December
2016) (http://www.ﬂynnpharma.com/about-us/news/cma-issues-
infringement-decision-against-ﬂynn).
29 Competition and Markets Authority, Press Release, Pharmaceutical
company accused of overcharging NHS (16 December 2016) (https://www.
gov.uk/government/news/pharmaceutical-company-accused-of-
overcharging-nhs).
30 Competition and Markets Authority, Press Release, Drug company accused
of abusing its position to overcharge the NHS (21 November 2017) (https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/drug-company-accused-of-abusing-its-
position-to-overcharge-the-nhs).
31 Danish Competition Council, Press Release, CD Pharma has abused its
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price for the drug by 2,000 per cent between April and
October 2014. The company was not able to explain the
sudden hike in its prices by any research and develop-
ment activities or any increase in production or distri-
bution costs.
The Council’s analysis in this case took into consider-
ation the role of parallel trade. The complaining hos-
pital buyer had entered into a supply agreement with
Orifarm, a parallel importer that competed with CD
Pharma. When supply from that importer was inter-
rupted, the distributor had to buy the residual amount
from CD Pharma at a much higher price. As part of its
determination that CD Pharma’s price was excessive,
the Council interestingly compared it to the price the
hospital had originally negotiated with Orifarm. The
Council also noted that CD Pharma’s abusive conduct
might have the effect of restricting parallel trade.
Speciﬁcally, suppliers entering into contracts that oblige
them to cover the loss in case of delivery failure are
likely to take into account the risk of compensation
claims from buyers who must source products else-
where at a higher price. This risk would fall more heav-
ily on parallel importers, who are generally less able to
secure a stable supply of products. Consequently, as a
result of CD Pharma’s abusive pricing, bids from paral-
lel importers might become less competitive, with reper-
cussions on hospitals’ procurement of medicines. As an
indication of the seriousness of the abuse, the Council
decided to submit the matter to the Danish State
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International
Crime.
IV. Exclusionary pricing
European competition authorities continue to prosecute
instances of exclusionary pricing, whereby a dominant
pharmaceutical company sets prices at which competi-
tors are unable to enter or compete effectively on the
relevant market, ultimately reducing the choices avail-
able to consumers and national health agencies.
A. MSD
On 23 May 2017, the CMA issued a Statement of
Objections alleging that MSD has breached UK and EU
competition law by implementing an abusive discount
scheme in relation to the supply of Remicade (inﬂixi-
mab) to the NHS.32 Speciﬁcally, the CMA indicated that
MSD’s discounts to the NHS were an abuse of its
dominant position insofar as they were likely to restrict
competition from new biosimilar versions of inﬂiximab
entering the UK market.
B. Roche (Romania)
On 7 December 2012, the Romanian Competition
Council launched two inquiries investigating whether
Roche abused its dominant position in the market for
oncological products in Romania. In the ﬁrst probe, the
Council is examining whether Roche is applying a dis-
criminatory pricing structure to favour direct-to-
hospital sales. Roche Romania SRL together with one of
its wholesale distributors are allegedly offering wholesale
prices that are signiﬁcantly higher than those the
Romanian afﬁliate offered in tender procedures for the
supply of hospitals.
In the second investigation, the Council is investigat-
ing whether Roche may be unfairly excluding generics
for its innovative cancer drug Tarceva (erlotinib) from
the market through the use of marketing and promo-
tional techniques The probe stems from the results of a
pharmaceutical sector inquiry concluded in 2016, in
which the Council found that cheaper, generic medica-
tions were unable to gain a signiﬁcant share of the
Romanian market. The sector inquiry determined that,
although prescriptions specifying a branded drug were
warranted only in exceptional cases, 57 per cent of
patients nonetheless requested a non-generic upon the
advice of their physician as the result of promotional
efforts by innovative drug companies.




On 23 January 2018, the EU Court of Justice issued a
preliminary ruling on questions referred by the Italian
Council of State in Roche/Novartis.33 This case arose
from appeals against the February 2014 decision of the
Italian competition authority imposing ﬁnes of €92 mil-
lion on Novartis and €90.6 million on Roche for
allegedly attempting to restrict competition between two
products, Avastin and Lucentis. The Regional Court of
Lazio upheld the authority’s decision on 5 November
2014, and its judgment was appealed to the Council of
32 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-issues-provisional-decision-in-
relation-to-drug-ﬁrms-pricing
33 Case C-179/16, F.Hoffmann-La Roche AG, La Roche SpA, Novartis AG and
Novartis Farma SpA v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato
(23 Jan. 2018).
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State, which referred questions on the interpretation of
EU law to the Court of Justice.
The case involves two drugs developed by Genentech
that came out of a research programme aimed at ﬁnding
ways to stop the process of blood-vessel formation
called angiogenesis, which feeds tumour growth in can-
cer patients and also causes certain eye diseases. The
ﬁrst drug to be developed was Avastin, which was
designed to treat cancer. A couple of years later, a
derivative of the main compound in Avastin was devel-
oped into Lucentis, a drug to treat eye disease. Before
Lucentis came onto the market, doctors used Avastin on
an ’off-label’ basis to treat eye disease as well. In other
words, even though Avastin was only approved for the
treatment of cancer, doctors also prescribed it for treat-
ing the eye disease, an unregistered or ‘off-label’ use.
As Genentech did not have a sales network in
Europe, it licensed the products out – Avastin to its par-
ent company, Roche, and Lucentis to Novartis. Avastin
was sold at a maximum price of €81 per injection in
Italy, while Lucentis was much more expensive – it
started at a price €1700 per injection, which was later
lowered to €900. Before Lucentis was launched on the
Italian market, Avastin was widely prescribed by doctors
on an ‘off-label’ basis to treat eye disease. The Italian
regulatory regime allowed such off-label use of a drug if
there was no registered treatment available. Once
Lucentis was launched on the Italian market, the off-
label use of Avastin for eye disease was no longer reim-
bursed because there was now a drug available that was
registered for the treatment of eye disease. The switch
from Avastin to Lucentis for the treatment of eye dis-
ease led to a dramatic increase in the cost of treating the
eye disease, which generated complaints by private
healthcare clinics and the Italian Ophthalmological
Society, which eventually prompted the competition
authority to open its investigation.
After a year-long investigation, the competition
authority concluded that Roche and Novartis had col-
luded to prevent Avastin from competing with Lucentis.
While Novartis naturally had an incentive to prevent
the use of Avastin for the treatment of eye disease,
Roche had a similar incentive because, as Genentech’s
parent company, it stood to gain more from the royal-
ties paid to Genentech by Novartis for sales of Lucentis
than from the proﬁts generated by sales of Avastin.
According to the decision, the parties carried out a
campaign aimed at artiﬁcially differentiating Avastin
and Lucentis by raising safety concerns about the off-
label use of Avastin to treat eye disease. More
speciﬁcally, Roche had sought a change to the label of
Avastin in order to highlight its risks if used to treat eye
disease, and the two companies sought to downplay
independent studies showing that the two drugs were
equivalent. The authority found numerous internal
documents discussing this strategy as well as communi-
cations between the two groups, particularly between
the managers of their respective Italian subsidiaries.
In their appeal against the decision, Roche and
Novartis argued that the restrictions on the off-label use
of Avastin were the result of the decision of the Italian
regulatory authority and were not caused by an illegal
agreement. The evaluations carried out by the Italian
and EU regulatory authorities indicated that Lucentis
and Avastin are not equivalent for the purpose of treat-
ing eye disease. Roche and Novartis also argued that the
systematic off-label use of drugs is unlawful, particularly
in a situation where a drug has been approved for the
same therapeutic indication. In short, it would have
been unlawful to sell Avastin for the eye treatment
under the relevant regulatory rules. The Lazio Regional
Court rejected these arguments and upheld the decision
of the competition authority. On further appeal, the
Italian Council of State put several questions to the EU
Court of Justice.
In its judgment, the Court of Justice ﬁrst addressed the
question of whether Avastin and Lucentis could be viewed
as belonging to the same product market – i.e. products
for the treatment of eye disease – even though Avastin’s
marketing authorisation only covered use for cancer and
not eye disease. This question was important because the
coordination between Roche and Novartis to try to pre-
vent the off-label use of Avastin would only restrict com-
petition if Avastin were in the same market as Lucentis.
In essence, the Court held that whether a product
market would include a product being used off-label in
that market depended on the effect that any alleged
illegality had on substitutability from the standpoint of
supply and demand. Whether such off-label use is ’legal’
is not determinative, but it may affect the analysis if any
illegality has an impact on the supply and demand of
the relevant products. For example, the Court noted
that, if a pharmaceutical product is manufactured or sold
illegally, it may not be viewed as substitutable or inter-
changeable because, from the standpoint of the manufac-
turers and distributors, the supply of the product would
entail signiﬁcant legal, economic and technical risks and
risk of reputational damage, and, from the standpoint of
payors and doctors, any purchase or use of the products
would entail a risk to public health.34
34 Roche/Novartis, para. 52.
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The Court’s approach of focusing on factors of supply
and demand, rather than the question of whether an
activity is ‘legal’ under the applicable EU or national reg-
ulations, is pragmatic as it will often be uncertain whether
the use of a product off-label is ‘legal’ – i.e. that it com-
plies with all applicable regulatory requirements. Further,
a competition authority is not well placed to resolve this
question. Indeed, the Court noted that whether the use of
a product off-label is legal is not a matter to be deter-
mined by the competition authority, but rather by the
competent regulatory authority.35 In short, the judgment
allows competition authorities to focus on standard mar-
ket deﬁnition factors of supply and demand, while also
obliging them to take into account any relevant decisions
or judgments of regulatory authorities concerning the use
of the products, to the extent such decisions or judgments
have an impact on the structure of supply and demand.36
In the speciﬁc case at hand, the Court found that nei-
ther the off-label prescription of Avastin nor the repack-
aging of Avastin so that it could be used for intravitreal
injection were necessarily illegal, but that the off-label use
and repackaging had to comply with certain regulatory
rules.37 The Court determined that there was no evidence
in the ﬁle to suggest that the conditions under which
repackaged and prescribed were unlawful, though this
would be a matter that the referring court could verify.
The Court then addressed the issue of whether the
concerted campaign by Roche and Novartis to provide
information concerning the possibility of adverse reac-
tions resulting from the off-label use of Avastin consti-
tuted a restriction ‘by object’ in violation of Article 101.
For the Court, the provision of such information would
be a restriction by object if it were misleading, which
was a factual matter to be determined by the national
court. The Court then explained that, failing compliance
with the requirements of completeness and accuracy
laid down in the regulation governing regulatory sub-
missions to the EMA, information would be misleading
if the purpose of the information was to (i) confuse
the European Medicines Agency and the European
Commission so that adverse reactions would be men-
tioned on the marketing authorisation, which would
enable the launch of a communications campaign aimed at
doctors and patients to exaggerate the risks, and (ii) to
emphasise the risks associated with off-label use of Avastin
in the context of medical uncertainty on this issue.38 The
Court also noted that, in a case such as this, where
companies that sold competing products engaged in a joint
campaign relating to the product of only one of them, this
might constitute evidence that the information was disse-
minated for reasons other than pharmacovigilance.
The Court’s standard for what is ‘misleading’ seems
to place undue emphasis on why the companies are pro-
viding the information (i.e. their intent), rather than on
whether the information provided is objectively incor-
rect or misleading. This standard thus provides compe-
tition authorities with a procedural shortcut, under
which they may establish an infringement without hav-
ing to prove that statements were actually incorrect or
misleading. For example, if a competition authority
were able to produce an e-mail by any employee show-
ing an intent to overemphasise the risks associated with
the off-label use of a medicine, the company could be
held to have committed a ‘by object’ infringement. In
that context, a company’s only defense would be to try
to establish that all information actually provided was
complete and accurate, a showing that would be difﬁ-
cult, at best, as the company would be attempting to
prove a negative. While it is appropriate to take intent
into account in the analysis of whether certain conduct
is anticompetitive, to ascribe such a critical role to
intent in these cases arguably goes too far.
The Court’s guidance on what is ‘misleading’ infor-
mation suggests that the context in which the informa-
tion is made available is critical as it could show an
anticompetitive intent. If, as in Roche/Novartis, there is
evidence that it was part of a campaign to prevent off-
label use for commercial rather than pharmacovigilance
purposes, it would seem more likely to be viewed as
misleading. Other evidence in Roche/Novartis also
seemed to work against the companies. While they pre-
sented scientiﬁc evidence concerning the problems with
off-label use, it appears that they omitted to mention
contradictory evidence. Also, the fact that preventing
off-label use would beneﬁt both companies and that
they cooperated in the campaign suggested that they
had motives that went beyond pharmacovigilance.
B. Actavis/Concordia
On 3 March 2017, the CMA issued a Statement of
Objections provisionally ﬁnding that Concordia and
Actavis had signed anticompetitive agreements to
restrict entry into the hydrocortisone market.39 The
35 Roche/Novartis, para. 60.
36 Roche/Novartis, para. 61.
37 Roche/Novartis, para. 59.
38 Roche/Novartis, para. 92.
39 Competition and Markets Authority, Press Release, CMA alleges
anticompetitive agreements for hydrocortisone tablets (3 March 2017)
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-alleges-anti-competitive-
agreements-for-hydrocortisone-tablets).
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CMA also maintained that Actavis abused its dominant
position by inducing Concordia to delay market entry.
Actavis was the only supplier to the UK until 2015,
when it bought the branded version of hydrocortisone,
which forced the drug to become de-branded and open
to generic competition. Although Concordia received
the ﬁrst marketing authorisation for 10 mg hydrocorti-
sone tablets, it did not enter the market shortly there-
after. Instead, the CMA found that from 2013 to 2016
Actavis agreed to supply Concordia with a ﬁxed amount
of its own hydrocortisone tablets at a low price, which
Concordia could then resell in the UK. These agree-
ments enabled Actavis to continue to charge high prices
in the UK. As discussed earlier in this article, the CMA
issued a separate Statement of Objections concerning
Actavis’ excessive pricing of hydrocortisone tablets to
the NHS.
VI. Parallel trade
There were no major competition law developments con-
cerning the parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the past
year. Nonetheless, the overall debate concerning this prac-
tice – whereby parallel traders buy pharmaceuticals in
lower priced countries for resale in higher-priced markets –
has continued, as have individual cases. As the European
Commission made clear in its 2003 Communication on
parallel imports of pharmaceuticals,40 the principle of the
free movement of goods within the internal market implies
that companies should be able to parallel trade pharmaceu-
ticals across national borders. Parallel traders have been
pushing the competition authorities to remove restrictions
allegedly implemented by pharmaceutical suppliers to hin-
der this practice. At the same time, however, governments
of lower-priced Member States have sought to impose
restrictions on parallel trade in order to prevent drug
shortages.
The Bulgarian government has been particularly
focused on the issue of medicines shortages, and has
used its position of holding the presidency of the
European Council to shine a light on the harm caused
to lower-income markets arising from parallel trade.41
In parallel, the Bulgarian government also announced
amendments to the country’s medicines law to intro-
duce measures to limit exports.42
Members of the European Parliament from Bulgaria,
Romania and Spain have also raised questions to the
European Commission concerning the impact of paral-
lel trade and its link to shortages of medicines.43 In
response to these questions, the Commission has gener-
ally taken a lenient line, allowing proportionate mea-
sures by Member States to restrict parallel trade:
‘Member States may adopt certain restrictions on paral-
lel trade subject to ensuring compliance with the Treaty
provisions. It should be noted that some Member States
have already taken national measures to prevent
shortages of medicines arising from parallel trade.’44
In contrast to these efforts to restrict parallel trade
and prevent medicines shortages, the association for
Europe’s parallel trade industry (EAEPC) has continued
its long-running legal ﬁght in Spain to remove alleged
barriers to parallel trade. Following a victory in the
Spanish Supreme Court in March 2016, the EAEPC has
now successfully forced the Spanish competition author-
ity to re-open an investigation into the EAEPC’s allega-
tions that innovative suppliers have implemented
systems of dual pricing in their distribution agreements
(with lower prices applied to products reimbursed by
the Spanish healthcare system and higher prices applied
to exports), thereby illegally hindering parallel trade in
violation of the EU and Spanish competition laws.45
This investigation remains ongoing.
In parallel, the EAEPC is also taking action before the
EU Courts in an attempt to force the European
Commission to prosecute similar allegations. In particu-
lar, with respect to the long-running case against GSK in
Spain (now running for more than 20 years), the EAEPC
is challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision46 to cease
investigating the dual-pricing system notiﬁed by Glaxo
Wellcome in 1998. The case is now before the EU
General Court, which heard oral arguments by the parties
in April 2017 and is likely to issue its judgment soon.47
While the judgments in the ongoing cases brought by
EAEPC remain outstanding, the January 2017 decision
of the Spanish competition authority in the separate
Pﬁzer/Cofares case indicates that EAEPC may be
40 European Commission, Commission Communication on parallel imports of
proprietary medicinal products for which marketing authorisations have
already been granted, COM(2003) 839 (30 December 2003).
41 See, e.g., Bulgarian Ministry of Health, Conference Agenda, A Conference
on Options to Provide Better Medicines for All (6 March 2018).
42 Bulgarian Ministry of Health, Press Release, The Government Approved the
Bill on Medicines, Submitted by Minister Ananiev (13 December 2017).
43 Parliamentary Questions P-001287-18 (1 March 2018), E-000365-18 (24
January 2018), E-003667-17 (1 June 2017), and E-001508/2017 (6 March
2017).
44 Response of the Commission (12 May 2017) to Parliamentary Question E-
001508/2017 (6 March 2017).
45 Press Release, Spanish Competition Authority, The CNMC initiates
infringement proceedings against six pharmaceutical laboratories for
possible anticompetitive conduct (21 March 2017).
46 European Commission, Decision, Case AT.36957, Glaxo Wellcome (27
May 2014).
47 Case T-574/14, European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies
v. Commission.
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unlikely to succeed. In that case, the Spanish authority
rejected similar allegations of dual pricing by Pﬁzer,
ﬁnding that Pﬁzer had only set a single price, with the
other price ﬁxed by Spanish regulations. The authority
also went further in noting that Pﬁzer’s distribution
structure created efﬁciencies and beneﬁts for patients by
reducing the risks of shortages of medicines in Spain.48
VII. Sector inquiries
A. France
In November 2017, the French competition authority
(FCA) launched a broad inquiry into the healthcare sec-
tor. In the decision opening the sector inquiry,49 the
FCA deﬁned the inquiry’s general objectives to include
gaining a better understanding of the factors that affect
pharmaceutical prices in France and developing strat-
egies to re-balance power between various players in the
distribution chain in order to encourage pharmaceutical
pricing that takes into account both the economic con-
straints of the sector and public health needs.
Speciﬁcally, the FCA expressed an interest in evaluating
two broad aspects of the healthcare sector:
• The factors affecting prices along the pharmaceutical
distribution chain. In particular, the inquiry will
assess whether any recommendations should be pro-
posed to improve competitive conditions throughout
the distribution chain and enhance the role of inter-
mediary distributors. In a previous sector inquiry
conducted in 2013, the FCA found that there was a
strong imbalance in the negotiation power between
pharmaceutical companies and distributors, which
resulted in low margins for distributors. The inquiry
will also examine ways to expand the competitive
conditions at the pharmacy level, including lessening
pharmacies’ monopoly over pharmaceutical supply to
patients, particularly for non-reimbursable medica-
tions (e.g. by loosening pharmacy regulations to allow
for the creation of pharmacy chains). The inquiry
will also examine ways to modernise the role of phar-
macies by facilitating the integration of additional
services, such as online sales.
• The regulation of pharmaceutical pricing. The inquiry
will examine the price negotiation process for reim-
bursable medications between the national price
regulation authority and pharmaceutical companies.
In particular, the FCA will assess what criteria are
currently being considered in price negotiations
(such as the improvement of medical results, the
prices charged elsewhere in Europe), what discounts
are being achieved, and whether the process should
be modiﬁed to better integrate aims such as reward-
ing innovation and ﬁxing prices that resemble those
that would be achieved under normal competitive
conditions. The inquiry will also investigate hospital
purchases of market-priced pharmaceuticals, includ-
ing hospital bargaining power. The FCA is particu-
larly interested in the negotiation process relating to
particularly innovative or expensive medications that
are ﬁnanced through a special mechanism and whose
prices the hospitals do not tend to bargain lower than
the cap negotiated through the national price regulat-
ing authority.
It is anticipated that the FCA will conclude its inquiry
and present initial ﬁndings in the latter part of 2018.
B. Austria
Theodor Thanner, the head of the Austrian competition
authority has announced to the press that the Authority
had begun an inquiry into the healthcare sector during
2017.50 While the authority has not yet published any
details or formal announcement of this inquiry, its the
general aim is to assess the current competitive situation
and to gain additional transparency with respect to this
sector. The national press has reported that Mr.
Thanner decried price hikes for pharmaceuticals in
Austria as ’the worst sort of speculation,’ indicating that
the Authority may examine pricing in particular as part
of its inquiry.51
VIII. Conclusion
For internal and external legal advisors active in the
pharmaceutical sector, the main takeaway from the
European case developments is to remain vigilant.
While the past year did not yield any cases involving
ﬁnes in the hundreds of millions or billions, as in other
sectors, there continues to be signiﬁcant activity by
payors, consumer associations, competitors and compe-
tition authorities, which has led to cases brought against
pharmaceutical companies for a wide range variety of
conduct. In general, it appears that EU and national
48 Decision, Spanish Competition Authority, Pﬁzer/Cofares (19 January
2017).
49 Decision 17-SOA-01 (20 November 2017).
50 See ’Wettbewerbshüter nehmen Gesundheitsbranche unter die Lupe,’ 2
February 2018.
51 Leopold Stefan, ’Kartellwachter: ‘worst speculation’ on drug prices,’ Der
Standard, 2 February 2018.
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competition authorities are broadening the spectrum of
conduct that they choose to prosecute as abusive, from
greater attention to excessive pricing – at least for off-
patent medicines – to aggressive lobbying strategies
with national regulatory bodies. Further, on most
issues, the EU and national courts have supported the
actions of the competition authorities, adopting legal
standards that provide them with signiﬁcant discretion
and placing the burden on pharmaceutical companies
to defend the legitimacy of their conduct. In this envir-
onment, pharmaceutical companies, particularly those
occupying a potentially dominant market position, can-
not view compliance purely as a list of particular
actions to avoid, but should instead assess their risk in a
more holistic fashion, taking into account the competi-
tion authorities’ increased willingness to expand their
reach to new areas where they perceive a potential
harm to the consumer or national health systems
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